REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGY:
A PRIVATE-PUBLIC INSURANCE SOLUTION
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ABSTRACT
Nanotechnology promises to revolutionize innovation in nearly
every industry. However, nanomaterials’ novel properties pose
potentially significant health and environmental risks. Views in the
current debate over nanotechnology regulation range from halting
all research and development to allowing virtually unregulated
innovation.
One viable regulatory solution balancing
commercialization and risk is the adoption of a mandatory privatepublic insurance program.

INTRODUCTION
Spurred by a strong financial commitment from the federal
government and robust private investment, nanotechnology innovation is
developing at a rapid pace.
As investment in nanotechnology
commercialization grows, several studies point to potentially serious
environmental and health risks introduced by manufactured nanomaterials.
The substantial benefits and risks of nanotechnology have resulted in wideranging debate over appropriate regulation. One viable regulatory solution
balancing innovation and commercialization benefits with health and
environmental concerns is the implementation of a private-public insurance
program.
¶1

This iBrief will discuss nanotechnology applications and risks,
review various nanotechnology regulations, and suggest a novel approach to
mitigating risk while maintaining appropriate incentives for innovation.
Specifically, Section I will discuss nanotechnology research and
development, focusing on the benefits of nanotechnology innovation and
the potential health and environmental risks posed by nanomaterials.
Section II will review the current debate surrounding nanotechnology
regulation, analyzing existing applicable regulatory bodies and regulations,
a newly suggested law, and other proposals. Section III will consider an
¶2
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insurance solution to regulating nanotechnology, discussing challenges
faced by private insurers in providing nanotechnology coverage and
proposing a private-public insurance program as a potential solution.

I. NANOTECHNOLOGY BACKGROUND
¶3
Nanotechnology is a term generally used to describe the production
and use of materials on a nanometer—or one billionth of a meter—scale. 2
The width of a human hair, by comparison, is approximately one hundred
thousand nanometers. 3 Nanoparticles occur naturally in the environment or
as byproducts of chemical reactions. 4 Manufacturing of nanoscale
materials was considered as early as 1959 5 and the term “nanotechnology”
was first used in the science community in 1974 6 . Until recently, however,
scientists were unable to manipulate matter close to the atomic or molecular
scale. Utilizing newly developed techniques, scientists can now engineer
nanomaterials with desired properties. 7
¶4
Subsection A of this section will discuss potential benefits of
nanotechnology engineering. Subsection B will discuss potential
nanotechnology risks.

2

DIVISION ON ENGINEERING AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES, COMM. FOR THE REVIEW
OF THE NAT’L NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SMALL WONDERS, ENDLESS FRONTIERS: A REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL
NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE 1 (2002), available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10395.html [hereinafter SMALL WONDERS].
3

Id.
John Balbus et al., Getting Nanotechnology Right the First Time, 21 ISSUES IN
SCI. & TECH., July 9, 2005, at 66.
5
See Francisco Castro, Legal and Regulatory Concerns Facing
Nanotechnology, 4 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 140, 140 (2004) (discussing
Richard Feynman’s speech at the meeting of the American Physical Society).
6
Louis M. Troilo, Patentability and Enforcement Issues Related to
Nanotechnology Inventions, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 36, 36 n.2 (2005)
(citing N. Taniguchi, On the Basic Concept of Nanotechnology, PROC. INTL.
CONF. PROD. ENG., Tokyo, Part II (1974)). The individual associated most with
popularizing nanotechnology is Eric Drexler who explored the area in depth in
his 1986 book, ENGINES OF CREATION: THE COMING ERA OF
NANOTECHNOLOGY. Ivan Amato, The Apostle of Nanotechnology, 254 SCI.
1310, 1310 (Nov. 29, 1991).
7
See Balbus supra note 4, at 66. See generally Rep. Mike Honda,
Nanotechnology Legislation in the 108th Congress, NANOTECH. L. & BUS., Feb.
2004, at 63, 64 (noting that nanotechnology research began in NASA’s Silicon
Valley facility in 1996).
4
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A. Nanotechnology Benefits
¶5
Nanoscale materials exhibit novel properties, including reactivity,
electrical conductivity and changes in surface chemistry.8 If appropriately
harnessed, these novel properties may effect innovation in almost every
industry. 9 For instance, scientists and engineers working on energy and
environmental initiatives believe that nanotechnology will revolutionize
energy production, water treatment, and environmental remediation. 10 The
National Science Foundation (NSF) predicts that over the next decade the
pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries will strongly rely on
nanotechnology. 11
¶6
The ability to manipulate and create nanomaterials is a relatively
recent phenomenon, nonetheless the evolution of nanotechnology
engineering is predicted to grow very rapidly. Linda Breggin, Senior
Attorney, Environmental Law Institute (ELI), and Leslie Carothers,
President of ELI, predict that nanotechnology sophistication will undergo
four stages before 2020. 12 The first stage, which already passed, includes
the development of passive nanostructures with a focus on manufacturing
coatings, polymers and ceramics. The second stage includes the
advancement of active nanostructures used in developing transistors,
targeted drugs, and actuators. The third stage, which is predicted to occur in
the year 2010, focuses on robotics, three-dimensional networks, and guided
assemblers. The fourth stage, called the molecular nanosystems stage,
includes the creation of molecules by design and the development of
evolutionary systems. 13
¶7
The NSF predicts that nanotechnology will represent a one trillion
dollar market by 2015 and will employ two million workers. 14 Some
commentators predict that by 2014, fifteen percent of all goods

8

Balbus supra note 4, at 65.
See Linda Breggin & Leslie Carothers, Governing Uncertainty: The
Nanotechnology Environmental Health & Safety Challenge, 31 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 285 (2006).
10
Balbus supra note 4, at 65.
11
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Nanotechnology: The Challenge of Regulating Known
Unknowns, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 704, 705 (2006).
12
See Breggin & Carothers, supra note 9, at 291.
13
Id.
14
MIHAIL C. ROCO & WILLIAM S. BAINBRID, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SOCIETAL
IMPLICATIONS OF NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY 3 (2001), available at
http://www.wtec.org/loyola/nano/societalimpact/nanosi.pdf. See also Sonia
Arrison, Nanotechnology Needs Nano-Scale Regulation, TECHNEWSWORLD,
Jan. 13, 2006, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/48272.html.
9
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manufactured globally will involve nanotechnology. 15 The economic
potential of nanotechnology is apparent from the investment therein at the
federal, state and private-sector levels. The federal government committed
over one billion dollars in nanotechnology funding when it enacted the 21st
Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act. 16 California is
attempting to create a “Nano-Valley” in hopes of reaping benefits similar to
those Silicon Valley provided to the state. 17 In 2004, venture capital funds
invested almost five hundred million dollars in nanotechnology start-ups. 18
Nearly 300 nanoproducts are already commercially available, 19 and over
4,000 nanotechnology patents have been issued since 1985. 20 The United
States is not alone in trying to capitalize on this technology—thirty
countries have enacted initiatives to promote nanotechnology
development. 21

B. Nanotechnology Risks
The same novel properties making nanomaterials commercially
appealing also pose potentially serious risks to human health and to the
environment. 22 Nanoparticles can enter the human body through skin
¶8

15

J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, EPA
AND NANOTECHNOLOGY: OVERSIGHT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 32 (2007) (citing
LUX RESEARCH, THE NANOTECH REPORT iii (4th. ed. 2006)), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&eve
nt_id=237810.
16
President George W. Bush signed the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research
and Development Act on December 3, 2003. Honda, supra note 7, at 63, 68
(appropriations totaled $809.8 million for fiscal year 2005 and $1,024.1 million
for fiscal year 2008).
17
Arrison, supra note 14.
18
Wilson, supra note 11, at 705.
19
Id. at 705; cf. Charles Choi, Nano World: New Nanotech Law Called for,
PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Jan. 17, 2006,
http://www.pacificresearch.org/press/clip/2006/clip-01-17-06sa.html (noting
that approximately sixty consumer products are available on the market).
20
Letter from Richard Denison and Karen Florini, Senior Scientist and Senior
Attorney, Environmental Defense, to Ms. Ann R. Klee, General Counsel, U.S
Environmental Protection Agency (May 22, 2006) (citing LUX RESEARCH, THE
NANOTECH REPORT (4th. ed. 2006)), available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/5265_StatusofNMsUnderTSC
A.pdf [hereinafter Denison Letter]; cf. Lindsay V. Dennis, Comment,
Nanotechnology: Unique Science Requires Unique Solutions, 25 TEMP. J. SCI.
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 87, 87 (2006) (noting that nearly 11,000 existing patents
contain the words "nano" or "nanotechnology").
21
James D. Thayer, Note, The SPS Agreement: Can It Regulate Trade in
Nanotechnology?, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15 (2005).
22
See Balbus, supra note 4, at 67.
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absorption, ingestion or inhalation. 23 Once they enter the body, because of
their size, nanoparticles can be carried past the blood-brain barrier into brain
cells and can pass through lung and liver tissue. 24 Studies indicate that
unique attributes of insoluble nanoparticles—a small diameter and large
surface area—significantly increase toxicity. 25 Some nanomaterials cause
oxidative stress and localized immune lesions, and may lead to other tissue
and cellular damage. 26 Nanoparticles are also linked to dangerous air, soil
and water pollutants. 27 A Rice University study showed that certain
individual insoluble nanoparticles become very water-soluble and
bacteriocidal when they aggregate. 28 The study raised concerns that
nanoparticle properties can endanger ecosystems by killing bacteria
constituting the base of the food chain. 29 The existing methods of filtering
and removing nanoparticles from water and air are very cost intensive and
generally unreliable. 30
¶9
The environmental and health risks that nonmaterial variants pose
have attracted sparse scientific attention. A report by Lux Research
indicates that over 10,000 nanotechnology research articles were published
in 2005, of those, approximately fifty focused on nanotechnology

23

Wilson, supra note 11, at 708.
E.g., J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
MANAGING THE EFFECTS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY, (2006), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Effectsnanotechfinal.pdf; see also
Scientist Warns of Nanotechnology Dangers, PHYSORG.COM, May 3, 2006,
http://www.physorg.com/news65890257.html.
25
Andrew D. Maynard & Eileen D. Kuempel, Airborne Nanostructured
Particles and Occupational Health, 7 J. NANOPARTICLE RESEARCH 587, 607,
(Dec. 2005).
26
See Balbus, supra note 4, at 66. Subsequent reviews analyzing this study’s
use of residual organic solvents playing an important role in determining
toxicity indicate that non-solvent varieties also show some toxicity to bacteria.
Email from Mark Wiesner, James L. Meriam Professor of Civil
and Environmental Engineering, Pratt School of Engineering, to author (Sept. 6,
2007, 01:56 EST) (on file with author).
27
See generally ANNABELLE HETT, NANOTECHNOLOGY: SMALL MATTER, MANY
UNKNOWNS 1, 15-29 (2004), available at
http://www.swissre.com/resources/31598080455c7a3fb154bb80a45d76a0Publ04_Nano_en.pdf.
28
See Balbus, supra note 4, at 66.
29
Id. at 65.
30
See HETT, supra note 27, at 30 (discussing centrifugation and ultrafiltration as
means of removing nanoparticles from water, and air-purification filters as
means of removing nanoparticles from air).
24
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environmental, health, and safety issues. 31 The dearth of academic and
industry attention in studying nanotechnology risk is less surprising when
one considers that federal funding for health and environmental risk
research represents only four percent of the proposed federal investment. 32
Postponing research of nanotechnology risks until after health and
environmental damage manifests is unwise. Indeed, if industry experience
with asbestos, ammonia, methyl chloride, sulfur dioxide and
chlorofluorocarbons is any indicator of the consequences of disregarding
risks during the early stages of production and distribution, 33 then
neglecting to adequately plan for these risks will lead to “lengthy regulatory
battles, costly cleanup efforts, expensive litigation quagmires, and painful
public-relations debacles.” 34

II. REGULATION DEBATE
¶10
In 2001, the federal government created the National
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to coordinate federal nanotechnology
research and development projects. 35 Segments of over twenty-five
agencies, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Department
of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), fall under the NNI’s oversight. 36 In 2003, the
21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act provided an
appropriation schedule for the NNI agencies that included over a billion

31

MICHAEL W. HOLMAN ET AL., TAKING ACTION ON NANOTECH
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY RISKS, at 7 (2006) (noting that in 2000
only eleven papers focused on environmental, health, and safety issues).
32
Fred Krupp & Chad Holliday, Editorial, Let’s Get Nanotech Right, WALL ST.
J., June 14, 2005, at B2. (noting that when private investment is factored in,
funding for nanotechnology environmental and health risk research becomes
“vanishingly small”). Mr. Krupp is President of Environmental Defense and
Mr. Holliday is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of DuPont.
33
Id.
34
Balbus, supra note 4, at 65.
35
Honda, supra note 7, at 64.
36
For a list of participating government departments and agencies see National
Nanotechnology Initiative, Government Departments and Agencies,
http://www.nano.gov/html/about/nniparticipants.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2008).
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dollars for fiscal year 2008. 37 Further, the 108th and 109th Congresses held
numerous hearings on the societal implications of nanotechnology. 38
¶11
The strong financial commitment of the federal government,
compounded by significant private investment, resulted in rapid
development of nanotechnology innovation. The rapid development led to
fierce debates to determine the appropriate level of nanotechnology
regulation. Commentators generally discuss four regulatory approaches: (1)
a complete ban on nanotechnology research, (2) strict government
regulation for private research and development, (3) adjustment to the
existing regulatory regimes to make them more applicable to
nanotechnology, and (4) a voluntary self-regulatory regime for private
research and development. 39
¶12
This iBrief will not specifically address the merits of each
regulatory approach. Rather, subsection A of this section will discuss
existing regulatory bodies and regulations. Subsection B will discuss a
proposal for a new nanotechnology-specific law, and subsection C will
examine other regulatory proposals.

A. Existing Regulatory Bodies and Regulations
¶13
Currently no regulations exist applying specifically to
nanomaterials. 40 Statutes most relevant to nanotechnology regulation

37

Honda, supra note 7, at 68.
Breggin & Leslie, supra note 9, at 296, n. 47-50 (noting the many hearings
before Congress concerning nanotechnology); see, e.g., Societal Implications of
Nanotechnology: Hearing on H.R. 766 Before the H. Comm. on Science, 108th
Cong. (2003); Environmental and Safety Impacts on Nanotechnology: What
Research is Needed?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science, 109th Cong. 1
(2005); Developments in Nanotechnology: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. (Feb. 2006) (statement of
Sen. Ted Stevens, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation); Press Release, Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, Senator Jeffords' Statement on Nanotechnology (Apr. 6, 2006),
available at http://epw.senate.gov/pressitem.cfm?party=dem&id=253725;
Promoting Economic Development Opportunities Through Nano
Commercialization: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Trade, Tourism, and
Econ. Dev., 108th Cong. (May 4, 2006).
39
E.g., Satya Thallam, Commentary, Nanotech, MERCATUS REPORTS, Fall 2006,
at 4-5, available at
http://www.mercatus.org/repository/docLib/20061108_Regulation_Fall_2006.p
df.
40
Scott Segal, Environmental Regulation of Nanotechnology: Avoiding Big
Mistakes for Small Machines, 1 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 290, 295 (2004);
Holman, supra note 31, at 12.
38
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include the Toxic Substances Control Act 41 (TSCA), the Occupational
Safety and Health Act 42 (OSHA) and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
43
(FDCA). 44
The EPA attempts to regulate nanomaterials under the TSCA,
which was enacted to ensure that adequate safeguards are put in place
before new chemicals are marketed to consumers. 45 Chemical substances
manufactured at the nanoscale level are arguably subject to regulation under
either the Section 5(a)(1) requirements for new chemical substances or the
Section 5(a)(2) requirements for existing chemical substances. 46
¶14

¶15
There are challenges to TSCA’s effectiveness in regulating
nanotechnology. 47 For instance, although tiny amounts of nanoparticles can
be toxic, the TSCA excludes certain chemicals made in relatively small
quantities. 48 Also, under Section 5(a)(1), new chemicals are grouped based
on their toxicity similarities to existing chemicals, but such groupings may
be inappropriate for nanomaterials. 49
¶16
The EPA issued six broad initiatives in February 2007 to underline
its role in nanotechnology regulation, more than two years after the federal
government’s first round of funding. 50 Among the initiatives is the
Voluntary Stewardship Program, which encourages nanotechnology
developers to provide the EPA with research data that can be used to
develop best practices. 51 The Voluntary Stewardship Program has come

41

15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2006).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006).
43
21 U.S.C. §§ 300-399 (2006).
44
Other laws that are possibly applicable to nanotechnology regulation include:
the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). DAVIES, supra note 24, at 10-14
(arguing that even if these laws apply to nanotechnology, their only practical
effect in many situations is the imposition of a ban on particle release into the
environment).
45
Id. at 13.
46
Christopher L. Bell et al., Regulation of Nanoscale Materials under the Toxic
Substances Control Act, 2006 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T., ENERGY, AND RESOURCES 7,
13, available at http://www.abanet.org/environ/nanotech/pdf/TSCA.pdf.
47
E.g., Davies, supra note 24, at 10-12 (arguing that TSCA only applies to
macro particles, which is a generic term referring to non-nanoparticles).
48
Kevin Bullis, New Nano Law?, TECH. REV., Jan. 17, 2006,
http://www.technologyreview.com/article/16323.
49
See generally Denison Letter, supra note 20.
50
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NANOTECHNOLOGY WHITE PAPER (2007), available
at http://www.epa.gov/OSA/pdfs/nanotech/epa-nanotechnology-whitepaper0207.pdf.
51
Id. at 68, 89-90.
42
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under strong criticism, and commentators exhibit doubt whether the
program creates sufficient incentives for industry participation. 52
¶17
In May 2007, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars issued a report proposing more than twenty-five actions that the
EPA can take to improve oversight of nanotechnologies. Central
recommendations include increasing federal government focus on
researching the health and environmental effects of nanotechnology, as well
as specific ways of changing the TSCA to cover nanoparticles. 53
¶18
The OSHA, which is implemented by the Department of Labor
(DOL), sets standards for hazardous airborne particles. However, the
OSHA’s determination of an acceptable quantity of toxic airborne
substances applies to macro-particles. Most commentators agree that even
if OSHA can be expanded to cover nanoparticles, the agency’s current
under-funding makes regulation almost impossible. 54
¶19
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implements the FDCA,
which regulates drugs, medical devices, biologics, cosmetics and food. 55
The FDA classifies nanoparticles as a variation of their base macro
substance and only requires new substances to be registered. 56 The FDA
claims that existing regulations are sufficient for nanomaterials despite not
requiring pre-market approval for products such as cosmetics. 57
¶20
In 2002, the NNI agencies and the White House National Economic
Council formed a review committee to evaluate interagency coordination
efforts, the suitability of federal investments, and risk coordination. 58 The
committee made ten general recommendations, none of which dealt with
monitoring or establishing risk guidelines. Further, the EPA’s Science
Advisor, Paul Gilman, noted that none of the agencies focus on the
convergence of nanomaterial jurisdiction across agencies. 59

B. A Proposal for a New Nanotechnology-Specific Law
¶21
Clarence Davies, a senior advisor to the Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, recently suggested a new law as the appropriate regulatory
response. 60 Davies argues that existing laws and agencies have significant
52

See, e.g., Breggin & Carothers, supra note 9, at 295.
DAVIES, supra note 24, at 5-6.
54
E.g., id. at 12.
55
Id. at 13.
56
HETT, supra note 27, at 36.
57
HOLMAN, supra note 31, at 12-13.
58
SMALL WONDERS, supra note 2, at 1.
59
Segal, supra note 40, at 301.
60
DAVIES, supra note 24, at 3.
53
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flaws making them inapplicable to nanotechnology. His most ardent
criticisms of existing regulatory laws include: (1) inability to account for the
uniqueness of nanomaterial behavior, (2) shortcomings in legal authority to
monitor nanotechnology adequately, and (3) under-funding by the federal
government of enforcement and measurement mechanisms. 61
¶22
The proposed law focuses on products rather than the environment,
and shifts the burden from the regulatory agencies to the manufacturers.
The law requires manufacturers to prove that newly developed
nanomaterials are safe to consumers and manufacturers. 62 Davies concedes
that an effective, coordinated, intra-agency program, similar to the
framework established for biotechnology, may be viable. 63 He notes,
however, that given the current political climate, passing a new law or
adjusting existing laws regulating commercial products is highly unlikely. 64
His proposal is not without substantive opposition, with many arguing that
it could harm small businesses and hinder innovation. 65

C. Other Regulatory Solutions
¶23
Nanotechnology proposals run the gamut from completely banning
nanotechnology production to eliminating all regulation. Suggestions
include creating a new federal department overseeing all emerging
technologies, 66 approaching regulation from a transnational perspective, 67
and regulating ex post by relying on traditional tort or workers’
compensation remedies. 68

61

Id. at 3, 8. These criticisms are grounded in the challenge to create
appropriate nomenclature for nanomaterials. For instance, “if C60 [bucky balls]
is not toxic, but aggregates of C60 are toxic, then what [level] of aggregate is
toxic . . . [or] do you regulate the initial C60 . . . if so does that include all
derivatives of C60?” Email from Mark Wiesner, James L. Meriam Professor
of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Pratt School of Engineering to author
(Sept. 6, 2007, 01:56 EST) (on file with author).
62
DAVIES, supra note 24, at 18.
63
Id. at 16.
64
Id. at 10.
65
E.g., Choi, supra note 19.
66
See Dennis, supra note 20, at 112.
67
Although this iBrief does not address international and cross-border
approaches to nanotechnology regulation, see Gary E. Marchant & Douglas J.
Sylvester, Symposium Article: Part III, How Do We Develop Regulatory Policy
in the Context of Limited Knowledge about Risks?: Transitional Model for
Regulation of Nanotechnolgy, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 714 (2006); see also
Thayer, supra note 21.
68
See generally W. Kip Viscusi, The Interaction Between Product Liability and
Workers' Compensation as Ex Post Remedies for Workplace Injuries, 5 J. LAW,
ECON. & ORG. 185, 186 (1989).
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Overall, dozens of non-governmental organizations have opined on
nanotechnology regulation.69 Some argue that manufacturer self-regulation
coupled with the existing light federal regulatory framework is the best
approach to ensuring that nanotechnology’s full market and social potential
is attained. 70 Several consortia of private nanotechnology research and
development companies have taken proactive steps by outlining potential
self-regulation approaches and setting standards. 71 Commentators in favor
of self-regulation argue that mere perception of risk, rather than actual risk,
should not serve as a basis for government intervention. 72 Also, they point
to biotechnology, where restraint in regulatory intervention has led to
significant innovative breakthroughs with almost no danger to public
safety. 73
¶24

Opposing those arguing for manufacturer self-regulation are those
arguing in favor of a slowdown of, or even a complete ban on, nanomaterial
production until environmental and health risks are appropriately
ascertained. These groups included the Natural Resources Defense Council,
the Center for Technology Assessment, and Greenpeace. 74

¶25

¶26
Many commentators urge that a comprehensive, multi-pronged
approach that “include[s] elements of regulatory and voluntary programs
under existing environmental statutes; corporate stewardship; tort liability;
federal, state, and local legislation; voluntary standards; disclosure; liability

69

Some of the prominent non-governmental organizations include: Action
Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC Group); Center for
Biological and Environmental Nanotechnology (CBEN); Center on
Nanotechnology and Society (Nano & Society); Center for Nanotechnology in
Society (CNS); Center for Responsible Nanotechnology (CRN); Environmental
Law Institute (ELI); Friends of the Earth (FOE); International Risk Governance
Council (IRGC); Meridian Institute; and Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars’ Project on Emerging Nanotechnology. Breggin & Carothers,
supra note 9, at 299-303.
70
Choi, supra note 19.
71
Breggin & Carothers, supra note 9, at 298 (noting that the industry groups
include the American Chemistry Council’s Chemstar Nanotechnology Panel, the
NanoBusiness Alliance, and the Nanoparticle Benchmarking Occupational
Health, Safety and Environment Program); Edward Rashba et al, Standards in
Nanotechnology, 1 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 185, 188 (2004) (noting that the
industry groups include the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(“IEEE”) and the American Society for Mechanical Engineers (“ASME”)).
72
See, e.g., HOLMAN, supra note 31, at 3. For a general discussion of risk
perception, see Howard Kunreuther, Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an
Uncertain World, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 257 (2002).
73
Arrison, supra note 14. Ms. Arrison is the director of Technology Studies at
the California-based Pacific Research Institute.
74
Thallam, supra note 39, at 5.
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insurance; and international measures” is the best way to balance innovation
and commercialization benefits with health and environmental risk
concerns. 75
Perhaps the best attempt at setting nanotechnology
development standards is spearheaded by the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), whose members include government agencies,
organizations, companies, and academic and international bodies. 76

III. INSURANCE SOLUTION
When faced with uncertain risks, the government may choose to set
regulation anywhere along the ex post to ex ante precautionary spectrum. 77
Because government regulations strongly influence enterprise decisions,
regulatory uncertainty adversely affects manufacturer productivity. 78
Uncertainty disables enterprises from making the cost-benefit calculations
necessary to determine appropriate risk-optimizing behavior. 79 As
nanotechnology manufacturers await—possibly indefinitely—a regulatory
response, a tension arises between the need to quickly capitalize on market
opportunities and the need to guard against possible liability exposure.

¶27

¶28
Manufacturers may rely on third-party insurance to overcome this
tension. Insurance significantly reduces transaction costs by establishing
beforehand the party responsible for damages if an accident occurs. 80 A
properly functioning insurance market allocates risk and thereby creates
appropriate incentives for responsible behavior, spreads economic
consequences of loss, compensates victims, and prevents over-deterrence.

75

Breggin & Carothers, supra note 9, at 310; Krupp & Holliday, supra note 32,
at B2.
76
See Press Release, American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), ANSINSP Releases Priority Recommendations Related to Nanotechnology
Standardization Needs (Nov. 17, 2004),
http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=8
17; see also Press Release, ANSI, Nanotechnology Survey Launched to Assess
Industry Needs, Apr. 25, 2006,
http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=1
202.
77
See Jonathan Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in HUMAN AND
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1513 (Dennis D.
Paustenbach ed., 2002).
78
See W. Kip Viscusi, Frameworks for Analyzing the Effects of Risk and
Environmental Regulations on Productivity, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 793, 793
(1983).
79
See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of
Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 944 (1988).
80
Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 293, 295 (2002).
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However, when the insurance market is not functioning properly,
private insurers behave similarly to risk-averse policyholders and are
deterred from underwriting risk. 81 The world’s largest re-insurance
company, Swiss Re, notes that the existence of a viable insurance market
depends on four factors:
¶29

1. Accessibility: Probability and severity of losses must
be quantifiable to allow pricing.
2. Randomness: Time of the insured event must be
unpredictable and occurrence independent of the will
of the insured.
3. Mutuality: Exposed persons must join together to build
a community to share and diversify risk.
4. Economic feasibility: Insurers must be able to charge a
premium which is commensurate with the risk, giving
them a fair chance to write the business profitably in
the long run. 82
Subsection A of this section will discuss considerations that
surround insuring nanotechnology by relying solely on the private insurance
market. 83 Subsection B will argue that, given the unique risks and short
history of nanotechnology, a private-public insurance program is the
optimal solution for regulation.
¶30

A. Private Insurance Considerations
¶31
Insurance policies do not specifically exclude nanotechnologyrelated risk. 84 As a result, private insurers recently expressed concerns over
the uncertain risks posed by nanotechnology. 85 To exist, insurers must be
able to diversify their risk portfolio among various policyholders as well as
81

Abraham, supra note 79, at 947.
Swiss Re, Nanotechnology—The Insurers’ Perspective, available at
http://www.swissre.com (search keywords “nanotechnology insurers’
perspective” and select first link) (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) [hereinafter
Insurers’ Perspective].
83
This iBrief does not address risks associated with non-nanotechnology aspects
of nanomaterial production, for more information see generally Christine
Robichaud et al., Relative Risk Analysis of Several Manufactured
Nanomaterials: An Insurance Industry Context, 39 ENV’T SCI. TECH. 8985 (Aug.
28, 2005), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cgibin/abstract.cgi/esthag/2005/39/i22/abs/es0506509.html.
84
Walter R. Stahel, The Insurability of Emerging Technologies, in
NANOTECHNOLOGY: “SMALL SIZE—LARGE IMPACT?” 33 (Annabelle Hett ed.,
2005), available at http://www.swissre.com-nanotechnology_report.pdf.
85
Wilson, supra note 11, at 706.
82
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among various events. Swiss Re points to three factors making
diversification impossible for nanotechnology:
1. Probability and severity of risks are impossible to
assess.
2. Many companies, industry sectors and geographical
regions are affected simultaneously.
3. Predicting the magnitude of a possible event exceeds
the capacities of the private insurance industry. 86
¶32
Nanotechnology presents serious concerns across all three of these
factors. First, while most previous technological leaps have been in areas
where a degree of knowledge and experience was available, here sparse
exposure and toxicology research, a lack of nano-related accident history,
and the breadth of nanotechnology applications leave insurers without
reasonable means to classify the risk posed by nanomaterials. 87 Second,
because many countries, industries, government agencies, academic
institutions, large multi-national corporations and small start-ups currently
participate in nanomaterial research and development, there is significant
concern that a nanotechnology-related accident could affect multiple classes
of policyholders simultaneously. 88 Even among individual policyholders,
nanotechnology risk exists in multiple lines of business and could lead to
multiple levels of damage—product liability, product recall, workers’
compensation claims, director and officer liability, and negative publicity.89
The number and type of possible claim permutations makes it difficult to
separate claim processing. Finally, the extent of potential claims is
impossible to accurately predict. Insurers are concerned that “[t]he
examples of accidents and individual claims frequently mentioned in
connection with nanotechnology are only the tip of the iceberg.” 90 If thirdparty liability insurers cannot assess the magnitude of risk, under-coverage
may financially cripple the policyholder’s business. 91 Nanomaterial
manufacturers also find it difficult to ascertain deductibles, as well as
determine conditions, exclusions, payout triggers, and indemnity
limitations. 92

86

Insurers’ Perspective, supra note 82.
See HETT, supra note 27, at 40.
88
Christopher Lauterwasser, Dealing with Risks and Opportunities of New
Technologies, in NANOTECHNOLOGY: “SMALL SIZE—LARGE IMPACT?, supra
note 84, at 37.
89
Id.
90
HETT, supra note 27, at 39.
91
See Richardson, supra note 80, at 295.
92
Id. at 328.
87
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The inability to screen nanotechnology manufacturers through risk
assessment, to classify nanomaterial risk and to determine which risks are
excludable from coverage will undoubtedly result in problems with adverse
selection and moral hazards. 93 Specifically, if private insurers are unable to
appropriately determine deductible and premium levels because they
possess less information than their policyholders, a disproportionate number
of high-risk nanotechnology manufacturers will aim to obtain coverage,
while low-risk manufacturers will elect to remain uninsured. 94 Further,
because the insurer is likely to accurately assess risk only after
nanotechnology-related accidents occur, the policyholder’s incentive to
avoid losses is eliminated. 95 The problem with inappropriate riskmitigating incentives is compounded for judgment-proof enterprises, whose
insurance coverage and other ability to pay for damages is less than their
potential nanotechnology-related liabilities. 96 Currently, victims of
nanotechnology-related accidents have no recourse for damages inflicted by
judgment-proof enterprises.
¶33

B. Private-Public Insurance Proposal
¶34
A private-public insurance program is a possible solution for
balancing the nanotechnology enterprises’ dual interests of capitalizing on
market opportunities and limiting liability exposure with the public policy
interest of stimulating responsible innovation. Currently a private-public
insurance scheme exists to address the low-probability, but high-loss, area
of nuclear accidents. 97 Nuclear accident insurance is covered by the PriceAnderson Act, 98 which provides an excellent template for approaching
nanotechnology accidents. 99

93

See Abraham, supra note 79, at 946-47.
Id. at 946.
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Id.
96
Richardson, supra note 80, at 327.
97
See Robin M. Hogarth & Howard Kunreuther, Ambiguity and Insurance
Decisions, 75 THE AM. ECON. REV. 386, 389 (1985).
98
Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in 23 U.S.C. §§ 2210,
2039 (2006)).
99
Since its enactment, the Price-Anderson Act has been continuously
challenged. The Act withstood a constitutional challenge and was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Entl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59
(1978). Today many organizations including The Cato Institute, Greenpeace,
Taxpayers for Common Sense and Green Scissors continue to oppose the PriceAnderson Act. See Barry P. Brownstein, The Price-Anderson Act: Is It
Consistent with a Sound Energy Policy?, THE CATO INSTITUTE, Apr. 17, 1984,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa036.html; Public Citizen, Price-Anderson
Reauthorization in H.R.6: An Insurance Scam for the Nuclear Industry,
http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/electricity/energybill/article
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The Price-Anderson Act was passed in 1957 and was recently
extended through 2025 by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 100 The PriceAnderson Act requires power reactor licensees to obtain the maximum level
of private sector insurance and, in the event of an accident, contribute
annually to a secondary insurance fund. 101 Currently, all such primary and
secondary insurance coverage totals over ten billion dollars. 102 All losses
above those covered by the primary and secondary insurance pools are
handled by the government. 103 The Price-Anderson Act indemnifies
nuclear power reactor licensees from tort liability and precludes victims of
nuclear accidents from claiming punitive damages. 104
¶35

Inaccurately perceived risks and other externalities cause private
insurance markets to break down and require government intervention. 105
Private sector insurance providers underwriting nanotechnology initiatives
confront concerns similar to those faced by private sector nuclear power
reactor licensees—inability to accurately assess both probability and
magnitude of loss.
¶36

A mandatory insurance program, similar to that required by the
Price-Anderson Act, would significantly reduce adverse selection problems.
By requiring insurance as a precondition of nanotechnology research and
development, a diverse pool of risk-seeking policyholders would be created.
Although the insurers’ inability to set appropriate premium and deductible
levels would persist, setting fees at a level that precludes the least
responsible enterprises from coverage would alleviate moral hazard
problems. A starting point for determining pricing levels may be based on
insurers’ experience with the biotechnology or chemical industries. Further,
indemnification from tort liability for nanotechnology participants in the
private-public insurance program would create the necessary incentives for
high-risk enterprises to adjust their behavior and avoid being uninsurable.
Mandatory insurance forces manufacturers of nanomaterials to prove that
their initiatives are safe enough to be insurable.

¶37

s.cfm?ID=10322 (last visited Jan. 21, 2008); Green Scissors, Nuclear Bailout:
Price-Anderson Act, http://www.greenscissors.org/energy/price-anderson.htm,
(last visited Jan. 21, 2008).
100
Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 601-610, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
101
AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y, PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: BACKGROUND FOR POSITION
STATEMENT 54, 1-2, (Nov. 2005), http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf,
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The pooling of insurance fees is another important aspect of the
private-public insurance program. After accounting for management and
other expenses, all collected nanotechnology-related insurance premiums
and deductibles would be pooled across insurers. A cross-insurer or
independent enterprise would have management and investment
responsibility for the pool. In the event of an accident, claimants would
receive damages from this pool. If possible, this pool would be broken
down into several categories including environmental and employmentrelated liability. Unlike other suggested regulations, the pooling function of
the mandatory private-public insurance program would eliminate the
concerns arising from judgment-proof enterprises. Also, the pool would be
composed of premiums and deductibles, factors that are directly correlated
with the level of risk associated with each nanotechnology initiative.
¶38

¶39
If the magnitude of loss from nanotechnology-related accidents
exceeded an insurance pool’s coverage level, remaining liability would be
covered by the federal government. Even though government intervention
creates an unavoidable moral hazard, the premium and deductible levels
should be set high enough to prevent the highest risk nanotechnology
manufacturers from becoming initially insured and therefore from
operating. Barring very expensive and persistent nanotechnology accidents,
the private sector would provide the majority of insurance coverage, freeing
government nanotechnology expenditures to be applied to research,
development and risk assessment.
¶40
A possible criticism of the private-public nanotechnology insurance
program is that it does not focus on eliminating nanotechnology-related
accidents, but rather focuses on after-the-fact compensation. Indeed, the
private-public insurance program assumes that nanotechnology innovation
is an essential step in technological evolution and is socially beneficial.
Therefore, the program’s goal is to prevent the over-deterrence of
innovation and to take steps to address the nanotechnology-related accidents
that most commentators perceive to be inevitable. Although the privatepublic insurance program prevents victims from pursuing tort claims, it may
wind up benefitting victims on balance, as it would replace the risk of the
tort remedy with the predictability of a no-fault compensation scheme.
While filing a lawsuit does not ensure the right or ability to collect
damages, 106 a strict liability standard eliminates the need for victims to
show either causation or fault (tort elements that are difficult to prove given
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PRICE-ANDERSON ACT BACKGROUND, supra note 101, at 2; see also Richard
Murray, Liability Regimes in a Changing Risk Landscape, in
NANOTECHNOLOGY: “SMALL SIZE—LARGE IMPACT?”, supra note 84, at 40.
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the current sparse research on nanomaterial risk) and allows for predictable
recovery of damages. 107
¶41
Another criticism of the private-public nanotechnology insurance
program is that, as with any regulation, it raises the price of market
participation above what small and start-up businesses can endure. But
unlike many previous technological innovations, nanotechnology research
and development does not occur in entrepreneurs’ garages. Rather, most
small and start-up nanotechnology companies are associated with large
businesses, universities and venture capital funds. If a small start-up
business’ nanotechnology innovation is truly promising, that company
should not have trouble finding appropriate funding for insurance coverage
from financial sponsors.
¶42
This insurance scheme also does not address the concern that in a
global environment the risk of nanoparticle dispersion transcends national
boundaries. With nanotechnology production, as with any global economic
initiative, the threat of developers and manufacturers racing to establish
laboratories and plants in low regulatory regimes is high. Although the
private-public nanotechnology insurance program is United States-focused,
it provides a starting point for expanding nanotechnology regulation
internationally.
¶43
Lastly, the private-public insurance program does not eliminate
difficulties with classifying nanotechnology research and risk. It creates a
derivative question of who is a nanomaterial manufacturer for regulation
purposes. However, mandating private-public insurance creates appropriate
incentives for manufacturers, insurers and the federal government to
collaborate on establishing appropriate research, development and risk
standards.

CONCLUSION
¶44
The same novel nanomaterial properties that are predicted to create
a one trillion dollar market by 2015 are also likely to create significant
health and environmental risks. The benefits and dangers associated with
nanomaterials stimulated fierce debates over appropriate nanotechnology
regulation. Commentators and interest groups have proposed a wide range
of possible regulatory solutions. This iBrief argues that a viable regulatory
solution exists in the insurance market. A hybrid private-public insurance
program resolves the current difficulties insurers face with accurately
assessing the probability and magnitude of nanotechnology-related loss.
Further, the private-public insurance program allows for collaboration
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among manufacturers, insurers and the federal government in establishing
standards.
¶45
To create appropriate incentives, the private-public nanotechnology
insurance program requires: (1) mandatory participation as a precondition to
research and development, (2) creation of a cross-insurer pool of premiums
and deductibles to use for claimant payouts, (3) federal government
coverage of losses exceeding coverage provided by a cross-insurer pool,
and (4) indemnification from tort liability of program participants.
Although the private-public insurance program does not resolve many
existing nanotechnology obstacles, it is a way to balance commercialization
and risk concerns.
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